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ABSTRACT
For many years, the main focus of international institutions and
bilateral aid agencies has been on state building as the main
action to support countries’ recovery from conﬂicts or other
fragile situations. The role of the private sector has been widely
overlooked, despite being crucial in supporting economic growth
and job creation. We argue that development ﬁnance institutions
have a dedicated role to play in closing ﬁnancial gaps, which are
widening as fragility increases. They have the comparative
advantages needed to make projects happen by supporting the
private sector, hence signiﬁcantly contributing to the recovery
process.
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1. Introduction
‘Continental Africa was, based solely on the total number of [militarised interstate dis-
putes] between 2002 and 2010, the most disputatious region of the world’ (Palmer
et al., 2015:10). Palmer et al. (2015) record 64 militarised interstate disputes in their
work. In 2015, nine of the 16 United Nations peacekeeping operations were located in
Africa, while continental or regional institutions such as the African Union in Somalia
led other peacekeeping operations.1 New security threats from Boko Haram, the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria, and Al Shabaab have emerged. Future conﬂicts related to water
shortages, land scarcity and degradation or climate change are highly likely, especially
in Africa, where a large share of the population relies on agriculture and shocks on
local agricultural prices increase the risk of violent events (Fjelde, 2015). Many states
affected by conﬂict experience a ‘conﬂict trap’ that results in weakened state institutions
and persistent instability (Collier, 2007). The key question here is: what assistance could
development partners offer to move these countries out of this vicious cycle and reverse
the trend?
© 2016 Government Technical Advisory Centre (GTAC)
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In recent years, development partners have realised the importance of following sus-
tained prevention of conﬂict with economic development, as the latter is critical for redu-
cing the incidence or probability of instability. International ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs)
and other regional or bilateral partners have tailored strategies to tackle speciﬁc issues
related to post-conﬂict situations. With this understanding, IFIs have concentrated on
strengthening the institutional capacity of post-conﬂict or fragile states, promoting demo-
cratic practices and ﬁnancing ‘bricks and mortar’ infrastructure projects. Criticism has
emerged over their slow progress (Collier, 2014) and quantum of support: more aid has
to be pulled in, but how, by whom and for what?
This article makes the case for an enhanced role for development ﬁnance institutions
(DFIs) speciﬁcally in post-conﬂict and fragile situations. DFIs can complement a
number of partners: IFIs who have an extensive role to play due to more support and
leeway for strategic interventions; emerging development partners who are more
focused on economic opportunities serving their strategic interest; and the private
sector. Thereby they could contribute to ﬁlling the wide development ﬁnance gap charac-
terising post-conﬂict and fragile situations. This article focuses on how DFIs engage in
post-conﬂict and fragile countries within their speciﬁc mandate, risk appetite and strategic
plans. The article addresses the following questions in the next sections:
. Is there a gap in development ﬁnance in fragile states compared with other developing
countries (Section 2)?
. Is there a dedicated role for DFIs in post-conﬂict countries (Section 3)?
. What are the key challenges faced by DFIs when operating in post-conﬂict countries
(Section 4)?
. What are the minimum conditions for success (Section 5)?
2. Post-conﬂict recovery and fragile states: who does what?
Since the rise of the fragile state agenda in the 1990s, post-conﬂict and fragile countries
have become the sole domain of IFIs followed by regional and bilateral development part-
ners. This article posits several reasons for this phenomenon, as discussed in the following
subsections. Firstly, fragility is a nebulous concept that deﬁes clear deﬁnition, which opens
the way to as many interpretations as development partners. Secondly, and as a conse-
quence of the lack of clear deﬁnition, the approach to fragile or post-conﬂict states
varies depending on development partner priorities. Finally, because of fragile state fea-
tures and the underlying risks, ofﬁcial development assistance (ODA) from IFIs often
remains the main source of ﬁnance into these countries. Nevertheless, other stakeholders
are also involved in these interventions –mostly emerging countries and the private sector
– thereby shifting the different development trajectory.
2.1. Identifying post-conﬂict and fragile states
As Giordano (2011:18) emphasises,
[T]here is a two-way link between conﬂict (both interstate and civil war) and fragility in the
developing world: many of the fragile states are prone to conﬂict; and most of the countries
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emerging from conﬂict are fragile. Consequently, when post-conﬂict interventions are under-
taken, countries are seen as fragile. This makes fragility the focus of the analysis.
Indeed, the main risk is for the recurrence of conﬂict due to the fragility of the situation.
IFIs have used many terms to qualify fragility: fragile states, failed states, failing states, dif-
ﬁcult environment and low-income countries under stress. But after the 9/11 attacks in the
United States, the fragility concept has eked its way into the lexicon of the development
community (Daviron & Giordano, 2007; Grimm et al., 2014).
The World Bank – together with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), as far as the rhetoric is concerned – played a hegemonic role
in shaping the policy doctrine around fragile states (Nay, 2014). Regional ﬁnancial insti-
tutions such as the African Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank have
followed suit. As a result, IFIs distinguish between four fragility phases and tailor
their engagements accordingly: marked deterioration of security; active conﬂict, pro-
longed political crisis or impasse; post-conﬂict or political transition; and gradual
improvement (moving towards stability). States move along this spectrum over time,
and regions within the state may be differently placed on the continuum at any given
time (Khadiagala & Motsamai, 2014).
This continuum makes it difﬁcult to identify the main features of fragile states, and
complicates the process of deﬁning fragility (Gisselquist, 2015). For the purposes of this
article, we have used the deﬁnition coined by the OECD Development Aid Committee
(DAC) since it evolves from a consultative process (OECD, 2012:85):
a fragile region or state has a weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions and
lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society. Fragile regions or
states are also more vulnerable to internal or external shocks such as economic crises or
natural disasters [… ]. Fragility and resilience should be seen as shifting points along a
spectrum.
Table 1. List of African fragile states and economies.
Region
Income level
Low income
Middle income
Lower middle Upper middle
North Africa Egypta Libyaa
Sub-Saharan Africa Burundia,b Kenya Cameroon Angolab
Central African Republica,b Liberiaa,b Congo Rep.
Chada,b Malia,b Cote d’Ivoirea
Comorosb Nigerb
Burkina Fasob Sierra Leonea,b
Nigeria
DRCa,b South Sudana,b
Sudanb
Madagascara,b Somaliaa,b
Mauritaniab
Malawib Togoa,b
Eritreaa,b Ugandab
Ethiopiab Zimbabwea
Guineab
Guinea-Bissaua,b
Source: OECD (2014), World Bank (2015).
Notes: List of fragile states as identiﬁed by the OECD. Italics denote countries that are new on this year’s OECD list.
aDenotes fragile states as on the World Bank list.
bDenotes a fragile state that is also deﬁned as a least developed country.
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Thirty-one of the 51 fragile states identiﬁed worldwide by the OECD are African
countries, while 15 of the 33 fragile states listed under the World Bank country
policy and institutional assessment classiﬁcation are in Africa (Table 1). The World
Bank and OECD lists include a wide diverse range of countries: a few are high achievers
in gross domestic product growth rates (i.e. Kenya, Angola), some have made progress
towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals and improving human develop-
ment (i.e. Mali, Niger, Ethiopia), and others had strong governments which suddenly
collapsed (i.e. Egypt, Libya). This highlights the difﬁculty in deﬁning fragile states
and the lack of consensus among the international community on the critical features
of fragile states (Grimm et al., 2014).
2.2. Development partners’ approaches to fragile states: state building as a
priority
Because of the aforementioned difﬁculty of agreeing on a common deﬁnition, and the
diversity of countries classiﬁed as fragile, the international community grapples with the
modalities of intervening in these countries. Risk is the common denominator of every
post-conﬂict or fragile situation. Consequently, development institutions are faced with
a partner paradox: incentives to work in post-conﬂict states are becoming scarce due to
demands to make aid more effective. Yet they have an obligation to make post-conﬂict
and fragile states their priority since this is where the need for external interventions is
the greatest. This is not only because populations in post-conﬂict states are mostly poor,
but also because ‘they are more likely to become unstable, to destabilise their neigh-
bours, to create refugee ﬂows, to spread disease and to be bases for terrorists’ (DFID,
2005:5). This situation has led development partners to adopt a number of different
approaches over the years in relation to fragile or post-conﬂict states. Table 2 maps
out some of those frameworks, clearly highlighting the various political motives under-
lying development partners’ engagement in fragile states.
Table 2. Summary of various development agencies’ approaches to fragile states
Organisation
Asian
Development
Bank (2007)
African
Development
Bank (2008)
World Bank
(2002)
OECD DAC
(2005) USAID (2005) AusAID (2006)
Terminology Fragile and
conﬂict-
affected
situations
Fragile states Low-income
countries
under stress
(LICUS): fragile
and conﬂict-
affected
countries
Fragile states
and situations
Fragile states Fragile states
Objective of
engagement
Improve aid
effectiveness
Address
prevention
issues;
address
political,
economic
and
development
issues
State-building,
peace-
building and
capacity
development
State-building Strengthen US
national
security,
improve
development
outcomes
and enhance
aid
effectiveness
Address
development,
economic,
security and
political issues
in a
comprehensive
and sequenced
way
Source: UN Ofﬁce of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and
Small Island Developing States (OHRLLS, 2013: 8).
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Since 2008 there have been many debates on how to engage with fragile or post-
conﬂict states. In 2011, the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States was discussed
in Busan, and the Istanbul Programme of Action called for international support to
least developing countries, including fragile and post-conﬂict countries. In February
2013, in Dili, discussions on the post-2015 agenda explored impacts on fragile and
‘conﬂict-affected’ least developing countries (Grimm et al., 2014). These discussions
build on the ‘good governance agenda’, which emphasises the role of the state as a
critical enabler of economic development through the provision of basic functions,
and points out state and institutions building as strategic objectives (Marquette &
Beswick, 2011; Gisselquist, 2014).2 There is an understanding that economic develop-
ment can only take place in countries that have political stability and strong insti-
tutional frameworks.
As a result of the multiplicity of frameworks, aid allocation to fragile states is hampered
by a crucial lack of coordination among partners: ‘donor governments and development
agencies still have a long way to go if the declared objectives of policy coherence and har-
monised approaches are to be reached when dealing with fragile states’ (Faust et al.,
2013:8).
These features inﬂuence aid allocation. Firstly, post-conﬂict and fragile countries have
mostly been under-aided as a result of the partner paradox and high risks (OECD, 2014).
Secondly, ODA is very unevenly distributed. In 2010, seven countries received half of the
total ODA to fragile states – Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
among them – with the other 42 sharing the remainder. This led to another paradox where
only a few fragile countries are over-aided while most of the others are under-aided
(McGillivray & Feeny, 2008). Thirdly, while aid to fragile states has increased from US
$11.38 billion in 2000 to US$50.04 billion in 2010, most of this increase has been due
to debt relief and not fresh ﬁnance for new development initiatives. More worrying is
ODA’s recent decline, which is likely to shrink again in the coming years (OECD,
2014). Fourthly, ODA to fragile states is far more volatile than aid received by other devel-
oping countries – each of the fragile states has had at least one aid shock in the past 10
years (OECD, 2013). Finally, ODA to fragile states might have lacked some level of effec-
tiveness, although there have been improvements, as illustrated by the independent evalu-
ation of the World Bank interventions in fragile states.
This evaluation revealed that, although the World Bank’s programmes have taken cog-
nisance of fragility, there are gaps related to the ﬂexibility of their programmes in post-
conﬂict situations and the ability to mitigate future risks. There has been limited attention
to conﬂict-related violence against women and the empowerment of women in conﬂict-
affected states, and more short-term to medium-term community-driven development
than long-term sustainable development (IEG, 2013).
These limits faced by development partners stress both the need for improving aid allo-
cation and effectiveness in fragile situations, and the inherent difﬁculty of making state-
building the main objective of most interventions. If development partners continue to
provide assistance to post-conﬂict countries without thinking about larger structural
2The Worldwide Governance Indicator Project identiﬁes six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political
stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of cor-
ruption (Kaufmann et al., 2010).
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arrangements, which implies a higher level of risks – that is, going beyond state-building
and good governance to include economic growth and job creation as key objectives
(Manning & Trzeciak-Duval, 2010) – their efforts might remain ineffectual.
2.3. Emerging development partners’ strategies to fragile states: seizing
economic opportunity as a priority
Emerging countries such as China, India, Brazil, Malaysia or Indonesia are increasingly
involved in Africa’s development, including in post-conﬂict and fragile states. The
China–Africa development fund was signed in 2006 at the ﬁrst Forum on China–Africa
Cooperation; contributing an initial US$1 billion that will eventually grow to US$5
billion in capital investments. India has set up its own aid agency (i.e. the Development
Partnership Administration) that has budgeted US$17 billion between 2012 and 2017;
the Brazilian Development Cooperation has committed funds to their companies invest-
ing in Africa; and South Africa expects to establish its own aid agency soon (i.e. the South
African Development Partnership Agency). The New Development Bank of the BRICS
bloc and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank will also add their ﬁnancial weight
behind projects in the developing world.
These emerging development partners have focused on non-intervention in the internal
affairs of their partners, rather than on good governance and state-building objectives.
This does not prevent them from looking at institutional capacity through support of
soft issues, such as technical assistance, capacity-building, system strengthening at
border posts, and so forth. In fact, they do not look at fragility as a factor for involvement,
but explore risk mitigation under those speciﬁc circumstances. They hence look at invest-
ment opportunities that lead to economic development. Emerging partners’ interventions
are almost always business oriented and often tied to their strategic economic and political
interest, which is out of line with the OECD principle of untied aid, while at the same time
serves private-sector development objectives that OECD-DAC members do not really
address – in fragile states, most emerging development partners offer a package encom-
passing aid, trade and investment (OECD, 2013).
The example of China is indicative of what other emerging partners also seek to
achieve. China appears to be far less risk-averse than OECD-DAC partners (Schiere,
2014). China’s involvement reﬂects a ‘new type of strategic partnership’ based on
mutual beneﬁt between itself and African countries, fostering economic development
while simultaneously pursuing national interests (Du Plessis, 2014). These emerging
development partners thereby lend a unique slant to ﬁnancing development in post-con-
ﬂict or fragile countries.
2.4. State-building and the forgotten private sector
The evolution of post-conﬂict interventions has put the state at the centre of the debate,
both as provider and as an institution. Development partners generally support the sover-
eign states, particularly through budgetary support, but in recent years the pendulum has
moved towards supporting projects directly through loans and equity. A necessary
requirement in both of these modalities is a well-supported and strong state. Therefore,
state-building has become the priority of many development partners (see Table 2). It
DEVELOPMENT SOUTHERN AFRICA 567
certainly is a necessary condition for development, especially in the long term, but it is
deﬁnitely not sufﬁcient for countries to engage in a virtuous cycle of development that
leads to sustainable economic development for all citizens. This means that some of the
roles the state should play need to be supplemented by private-sector involvement in
these countries to drive economic development.
The private sector is beginning to seize opportunities in post-conﬂict recovery pro-
grammes, at times supported by emerging donors, as mentioned previously. Some
fragile states have begun to attract foreign direct investment due to their fast growth
rates, but their high risks continue to be a dampener on sustainable growth. Foreign
direct investment in fragile states is increasing, mainly in oil and mining, while over-
looking manufacturing and agriculture, which could produce more jobs in the long
term (IMF, 2014). Oil and mining offer higher returns and therefore create incentive
for private companies and investors to take more risks. As stated by the OECD
(2013:42), ‘[t]here seems to be signiﬁcant room for increased private sector ﬂows’.
Africa’s attractiveness to investors is also increasing due to phenomenal population
growth, mass urbanisation, a growing middle class and a dynamic youthful population.
Of course, these could be negatives too as urban infrastructure is strained, inequality
grows and youths fail to ﬁnd jobs in the new economies. Climate change and water avail-
ability will certainly add stress fractures to already fragile and vulnerable African
countries, and in some cases might be responsible for additional conﬂict.
Current debates factor in the importance of private-sector involvement at an early
stage of the recovery process: in generating economic development, the private sector
could underscore peace efforts through job creation and economic opportunities
(Gerson, 2001). In the 2014 World Economic Outlook report, the IMF pointed out
that even in countries with a lower degree of investment efﬁciency, which characterises
post-conﬂict countries, a one percentage point increase of gross domestic product in
public investment increases output by about 2.2% in the long term (IMF, 2014). If
the public and private sectors were to combine forces in post-conﬂict countries, the
Economist’s ‘Aspiring Africa’ narrative, which emphasises the huge potential of the con-
tinent, might be realised (The Economist, 2013). In all of these narratives, research has
not sufﬁciently considered the role of DFIs, whose mandate is often to ﬁnance private-
sector development.
3. Is there a speciﬁc role for DFIs in post-conﬂict countries?
3.1. The nature of DFIs: closing the ﬁnancing gap
DFIs or development banks ideally should narrow the gap between pure private-sector
commercial loans, government grants and ﬁscal transfers (e.g. Development Bank of
Southern Africa (DBSA) and Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) in South
Africa, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES) in Brazil,
China Development Bank (CDB) in China, Proparco in France, CDC in the United
Kingdom and Kreditanstalt Für Wiederaufbau (KfW) in Germany). These are majority-
owned by governments with a domestic or international mandate, or both. While de
Aghion (1999:83) states that ‘[d]evelopment banks are government-sponsored ﬁnancial
institutions concerned primarily with the provision of long-term capital to industry’, it
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might be better to acknowledge the role DFIs play in overcoming a broader range of
market failures. The lack of long-term investment is but one of the market failures encoun-
tered in many developing countries where commercial ﬁnancial intermediaries tend to
neglect emerging industries and avoid immature ﬁnancial environments. DFIs seek to
narrow the gap between public and private ﬁnance (Figure 1):
through their willingness to take political and general country risks that private sector inves-
tors have less appetite for, non-ﬁnancial constraints to private sector investment in what is
perceived to be economically depressed areas are mitigated and market comfort brought
to fruition. This leveraging accelerates the pace at which development backlogs can be
addressed. (Musasike et al., 2010:4)
When supporting the private sector, DFIs seek to demonstrate ‘the beneﬁts of successful
investments to other suppliers of capital and, by so doing, raising the amount capital
mobilised. This would contribute to the development of the ﬁnancial sector as a whole’
(te Velde & Warner, 2007:2).
By engaging in riskier markets, DFIs might facilitate private-sector entry into those
markets and pave the way for future agreements and trade:
DFIs can substantially reduce the cost of capital to borrowers by the partial transfer of a
subsidy through the interest rate or the tenor (maturity and grace periods), asset and liab-
ility matching or by stipulating less onerous collateral requirements. Further, DFIs have a
better understanding of developmental risk, a higher risk appetite, and a stronger risk
rating, all of which they can use to beneﬁt poorer or unrated clients. The inclusion of
more commercially orientated projects in their portfolios also allows them to cross-subsi-
dise development projects in poor areas. (Musasike et al., 2010:4)
Figure 1. Financial niche of DFIs.
Source: Musasike et al. (2010).
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Hence DFIs have a higher risk tolerance and a longer investment horizon.
In today’s world, DFIs should have a triple bottom line, encompassing their econ-
omic, social and environmental impacts. In post-conﬂict or fragile countries,
however, DFIs, like other external actors, do not want to undermine the state-building
process. DFIs are meant help the private sector enter high-risk markets by facilitating
the creation of an environment conducive to the protection of private-sector invest-
ments and interests (governance, rule-based structures, etc.), along with the provision
of social and environmental goods and services. But they have to ﬁnd ways of doing
so without weakening the state as a decision-making and policy formation entity
(OECD, 2010).
3.2. DFIs in fragile situations
The development ﬁnance gap in post-conﬂict and fragile situations differs critically from
that described in the previous section, as shown in Figure 2. Firstly, post-conﬂict govern-
ments have fewer resources for public investment than stable countries due to the low
capacity to absorb ﬁnance and the low levels of tax collection (OECD, 2014). This pushes
the government’s ﬁnance capacity to the left. Secondly, the threshold of private-sector
engagement becomes much lower than in other countries, pushing its limit to the right.
At the same time, private companies and investors perceive much higher and broader
risks, thereby pushing the risk curve up and to the right. This is mainly due to the
limited state capacity to develop a conducive and trusting environment for private-sector
involvement, and to the difﬁculty that development partners have in addressing these
Figure 2. DFI role in post-conﬂict and fragile situations.
Source: Authors.
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drawbacks in ways other than those related solely to state-building. The development
ﬁnance gap is widening considerably as a consequence of limited state resources and
increased risks.
IFIs and other regional and bilateral development partners who provide mostly grants
and soft loans to support state-building partially close this gap. However, because ODA
remains very volatile and unevenly distributed, the gap-closing capacity of development
partners varies widely over time. Emerging development partners are mostly private
sector oriented, and thereby partly complement state-building interventions. However,
their strategy based on both non-intervention in the internal affairs of partner countries
and support to economic opportunities guided by national interests remains highly selec-
tive and thereby constrains their ability to close the development ﬁnance gap.
A ﬁnancial niche thus remains for DFIs. Because of their knowledge of working in dif-
ﬁcult environments and the tools they have at their disposal, they aim to ‘address the
capital market inefﬁciencies where private capital is unwilling or unable to bear the risk
of providing capital to countries, projects or clients that are not considered creditworthy’
(Musasike et al., 2010:3). One additional advantage DFIs have is the willingness to ﬁnance
‘public goods’ or socio-economic projects with no clear economic reward, which the
private sector has been reluctant to ﬁnance (Thorne & du Toit, 2009).
Indeed, to achieve their mission, DFIs have at their disposal several instruments that
commercial banks do not ordinarily have (te Velde & Warner, 2007): capital or sovereign
guarantees; dividend and/or tax exemptions; subsidies for debt ﬁnancing (lower interest
rates, longer maturity, grace period, foreign currency debt payment, loan structure); sub-
sidies for equity ﬁnancing (discounted rate of return, lower expected dividends); and tech-
nical assistance (feasibility study, project management). This wide array of instruments
allows them to adapt to many situations, including post-conﬂict and fragile environments.
However, in such difﬁcult countries, they can only close the ﬁnancing gap when private
investments actually support local economic development.
4. How could the private sector support economic development in post-
conﬂict and fragile situations?
There is no reason a priori to expect that the perception of Africa as a ‘market’ open for
business will preferably trigger development rather than simply perpetuate the interest of
big capital. This is especially true in fragile environments. A weak government will not be
able to ensure that market economy beneﬁts will reach parts of society that need develop-
ing; therefore, the risk of triggering conﬂicts is high. However, despite market and govern-
ment failures, private investments can make a difference and support recovery.
4.1. Market and government failure: who manages the risk?
Market failure, deﬁned as the inefﬁcient allocation of resources in a free market, is respon-
sible for perceived inadequacies of the private sector. In many developing countries,
market failure is so substantial that it spells a loss of private-sector interest in project devel-
opment and ﬁnancing. Ideally, a benevolent government should develop policies – be they
incentives or command and control regulations – to overcome these failures and ensure an
enabling environment in which the private sector could expand proﬁtably. Unfortunately,
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in these same developing countries, governments also tend to fail because they do not have
the capacity and/or the willingness to address market failure. Consequently, the involve-
ment of the private sector is limited and the economic and social beneﬁts do not peak, as
they do when markets are operating optimally. The situation is even more worrying in
fragile environments where weak formal institutions and poor governance are prevalent.
Games (2011) cites the high cost of doing business in Africa as the main limitation to
private companies entering those markets. Moreover, poor or non-existent infrastructure,
regulatory and tax uncertainty, difﬁcult and expensive logistics, a surfeit of bureaucracy,
the absence of effective legal frameworks, corruption, skill shortages and currency ﬂuctu-
ations make businesses far more cautious about entering new markets in Africa. Finally,
secondary risks include those related to language and business culture differences, the
choice of local partners, a weak local private sector, a lack of market information, weak
government institutions, work permit issues, non-payment, a trend towards local
content and empowerment, operating licence requirements, tender delays and costs of ten-
dering, and security of people and assets. The riskier the investment, the higher the
expected returns; that is, the more expensive the ﬁnance. To some extent, when risks
are too high, investments do not make economic sense because ﬁnance becomes over-
priced, which is when governments need to become risk managers by developing policies
aimed at reducing or reallocating risks – even though a government will never be a perfect
risk manager (Moss, 2002:49–52). In fragile environments, not only do governments gen-
erally fail to play this risk manager role, they tend to generate more risks by pursuing pol-
itical rather than collective interests in the search for political longevity.
What the private sector does require is a government that facilitates market function-
ality and ensures the protection of private-sector interests. Public–private partnerships
(PPPs) or public–private investments have become an emblematic tool in generating
private-sector involvement and delivering economic and social beneﬁts to local popu-
lations. PPP frameworks are being developed across Africa to ensure that private-sector
interest is protected through enabling legislation and facilitating the ‘ease of doing
business’. While PPPs have been rather successful in some instances (Simon et al.,
2014), they are not, however, the panacea because regulatory frameworks have not
caught up, in many instances, with the demand for new partnerships between public
and private sectors, and institutional capacities have been limited for PPPs to succeed
(Trebilcock & Rosenstock, 2015). Of course, these institutional capacities are even
scarcer in fragile environments. The private sector therefore tends to be crowded out.
4.2. Extractive industries as ﬁrst investors …
As a direct consequence of the lack of risk management by governments in post-conﬂict and
fragile states, industries in the extractive sector are the ﬁrst investors because this sector deli-
vers high returns on investment, hence encouraging companies to takemore risks. Generally,
development partners view extractive industries as a hurdle rather than an opportunity for
recovery as controversy has emerged on the role of natural resources in fuelling conﬂict
and delaying peace (Ron, 2005; Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009; Bhattacharyya & Collier,
2014). It would be hasty to conclude that what has been commonly named the ‘resource
curse’ would inevitably lead to a conﬂict trap, although that conclusion would be correct if
the gains obtained through resource extraction were corruptly invested offshore or
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misdirected to sectors that do not generate overall economic growth. The question is not
whether foreign direct investment is undesirable because of its potentially harmful effect,
but rather how to make the most of investments, proﬁt and social services in the recovery
process, especially for the beneﬁt of local communities. In this regard, voluntary initiatives
such as the Kimberley process for certifying diamond origins for the prevention of blood
diamond trade, and the ‘publish what you pay’ initiative that calls for transparency in
countries’ investments in the developing countries, help create an enabling environment
for private-sector involvement. In addition, the extractive industries transparency initiative
that calls for clear regulations in disclosing interests in natural resources has encouraged
private companies to modify their practice, to collaborate in conﬂict prevention initiatives
and to encourage their investments in those countries. This engagement in extractive indus-
tries demonstrates that capital intensive and risky investments by ﬁnancially strong and large
companies are possible today in Africa when the project is of economic and strategic
importance.
4.3. … But not only
Beyond extractive companies, foreign investors are reluctant to go into post-conﬂict and
fragile states despite the advantages of being the ﬁrst mover or beneﬁts from loose regu-
latory frameworks. They engage with post-conﬂict or fragile countries mainly through
contracts with the government or, more directly, development agencies to provide
goods and services (Hauﬂer, 2007). Interestingly, private investments thrive in sectors
such as telecommunications (mostly mobile phone hardware and software), banking ser-
vices, manufacturing or other services.
The fairly high degree of scepticism in boardrooms, particularly those in South Africa,
is largely due to perceptions of risk, rather than the experience of it, with a dose of Afro-
pessimism, exacerbated by poor local media coverage of business on the continent and the
media’s emphasis on incidents of political instability – but emerging markets interest in
Africa has eroded some of these doubts. ‘DFIs have a particular role to play in facilitating
and underwriting deals that involve state-owned enterprises in other African countries’
(Games, 2011:12).
DFIs could facilitate entry of the private sector into African markets. They would
provide a risk-limiting springboard into the region as an initiator and guarantor of pro-
jects. Once DFIs enter a region, the private sector would follow suit and begin to
engage with potentially rewarding markets in which they had not previously ventured.
5. What are the conditions for success?
While DFI risk proﬁles are meant to be greater than those of commercial banks, it is often
suggested that these proﬁles might be pitched well above actual risk in post-conﬂict and
fragile markets. As a result, the ability of DFIs to overcome ﬁnancial market failure is
restricted, which undermines their potential to impact positively on development.
Looking at bilateral, regional and multilateral DFIs, te Velde & Warner (2007) question
the willingness of DFIs to take higher risks to promote private investment. However,
DFI involvement cannot be limited to their appetite for risk. They need to consider at
least four factors: their ability to go beyond a superﬁcial analysis of risks; their potentially
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strong impact on development in a context where a ﬁrst move counts; the positive ripple
effect on improvement of the investment climate; and their participation in the state-
building process or in doing no harm (OECD, 2010). The ﬁrst two are particularly relevant
for DFIs working in African fragile and post-conﬂict countries.
5.1. Addressing the risk perception issue
The most expected outcome of increased private investment in fragile situations would be
a very high rate of project failure because of the high levels of risk, with the main reason
being an unfamiliar environment where information is limited and perceptions of risk are
high. DFIs will need to understand and mitigate perceived systemic risk to address the
misperception of risks in developing countries more generally, and in post-conﬂict
countries speciﬁcally.
An in-depth evaluation of a risk must rely on information that is generally not available
in post-conﬂict or even stable African states. Warnholz (2008) attributes this to the per-
vasive information deﬁcit about African markets. Table 3 presents credit ratings published
by the main rating agencies for the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
region. Firstly, rating agencies rate more countries now than in 2010, reﬂecting easier
access to information in international markets. Secondly, the major rating agencies did
not rate one of the few fragile countries of the region in 2010, while they only rated the
DRC in 2015. In countries with no sovereign debt rating, companies ﬁnd it difﬁcult to
access the international credit market, although the early-2015 bond uptake in Tanzania
proves that opportunities sometimes outweigh the perceived risk.3 African institutions rely
heavily on international assessments of their economic and social well-being. In the
current context, not many DFIs could play the role of information collators because
Table 3. SADC country ratings in 2010 and 2015.
Fitch Moody’s S&P
2010 2015 2010 2015 2010 2015
Angola – BB− – Ba2 – B+
Botswana – – A2 A2 A A−
DRC – – – B3 – B−
Lesotho BB− BB− – – – –
Madagascar – – – – – –
Malawi – B− – – – –
Mauritius – – Baa2 Baa1 – –
Mozambique B B+ – B B+ B1
Namibia BBB− BBB− – Baa3 – –
Seychelles – B+ – – – –
South Africa BBB+ BBB A3 Baa2 BBB+ BBB−
Swaziland – – – – – –
Tanzania – – – – – –
Zambia – B – B1 – B+
Zimbabwe – – B1 – B+
Source: Fitch: https://www.ﬁtchratings.com/site/ﬁtch-home/sovereigns, Moody’s: https://www.moodys.com/researchan
dratings/market-segment/sovereign-supranational/-/005005/4294966293/4294966623/-1/0/-/0/-/-/en/global/rr, S&P:
https://www.standardandpoors.com/en_AP/web/guest/home websites, accessed 23 March 2015.
3The Economist Intelligence Unit asserts that Tanzania’s sovereign risk score is in the ‘middle of the B rating band’: http://
country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1201767304&Country=Tanzania&topic=Risk&subtopic=Credit±risk&subsubtopic=
Sovereign±risk&aid=1&oid=28321787 Accessed 23 March 2015
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their capacity to do so is weak and they are faced with so many other institutional chal-
lenges. Ideally, DFIs should collate necessary information in this context to provide a
public good.
This does not mean that a sovereign rating is sufﬁcient to evaluate risk, especially in
fragile environments. For instance, instability in the Kivu region in the DRC does not
mean that the Katanga region is also unstable, despite the fact that the country rating is
the same for the two provinces. Consequently, there is a need for more precise and reliable
information, which could include a thorough assessment of risks of different regions and
sectors within countries.
DFIs thus need to address risk perceptions through their willingness to operate in dif-
ﬁcult environments. Developing data collection processes and appropriate techniques to
identify probabilities associated with a range of events may solve only part of the
problem. At the same time, checks and balances may be required to avoid potential
biases in the way DFIs estimate risks. This latter element is crucial for DFIs where devel-
opment impact and development results are as important as ﬁnancial results.
A ﬁnal risk perception is that certain DFIs perceive Africa as a highly risky continent in
terms of doing business and investing. A continued perception of Africa as the ‘dark con-
tinent’, or one in which corrupt government ofﬁcials and business people are just waiting
for hapless internationals to invest their money, taints business relationships on the con-
tinent and makes business expensive and ‘high risk’. Only transparent and informative
processes and regular business contacts could allay these fears.
5.2. Introducing reﬂexivity: development impact assessment
DFIs should take project impacts into account when evaluating risks, and thereby select
the most impactful sectors depending and local contingencies. As development insti-
tutions, DFIs include these criteria in the credit pricing since the higher the project’s
social and economic impact, the higher the potential stabilising effect of the project. A
project should be identiﬁed as a priority for most local stakeholders, including the local
population, and should ﬁt into the development strategy of public authorities (including
the government), while not undermining local accountable institutions (local government
or chiefdom, communities, etc.). Because ﬁnancing these projects might enhance future
stability, it might also reduce future risks, facilitate future investment and hence create
a virtuous development cycle out of conﬂict and poverty. DFIs should therefore target
under-invested – and therefore riskier – countries and sectors with projects with high
social, environmental and economic impact, and balance these impacts against existing
risks so as not to jeopardise the ﬁnancing of projects. By measuring the development
impact of projects, DFIs are in a position to determine whether they need to be risk
averse or risk tolerant, and in which sectors, through impact assessment tools based on
four pillars: ﬁnancial performance; economic performance; environmental and social per-
formance; and private-sector development (Kingombe et al., 2011).
6. Conclusion
Is there a role for DFIs in post-conﬂict countries? Current analyses of post-conﬂict inter-
ventions lack emphasis on economic recovery while stressing public and private
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interventions in state-building initiatives. Economic recovery is a crucial step towards
exiting the conﬂict trap. The present article makes the case for a potential role for DFIs
in closing part of the ﬁnancial gap, which becomes increasingly wider as fragility increases.
DFIs theoretically have the comparative advantages needed to implement projects by sup-
porting the private sector, and hence to signiﬁcantly contribute to the recovery process.
They have the tools required to take higher risks, the knowledge to intervene in difﬁcult
environments and the capacity to raise funds. Therefore, they should be able to strengthen
local initiatives, especially those aimed at job creation and raising revenue to support the
stabilisation process. Indeed, successful projects could yield a signiﬁcant development
impact, especially since the needs are so overwhelming in post-conﬂict and fragile
countries that a new project of signiﬁcant economic and social importance has a poten-
tially high impact.
However, DFIs need to overcome at least four hurdles. The ﬁrst relates to the difﬁculty
to assess risks in post-conﬂict countries due to the lack of both information and experi-
ence. This implies that special effort is needed for DFIs to collect information and
develop their own risk assessment tools so as to go beyond the perceived risk syndrome.
It also provides DFIs with opportunities to take the lead in projects in regions with post-
conﬂict member states. The second hurdle is probably to learn from the private sector.
While some private companies are actually able to take on risks to develop projects in
such difﬁcult contexts – most of the time the high rewards offset the risks they take –
others can simply not cope with situations fraught with difﬁculties. Third, DFIs must
understand the speciﬁcities related to every post-conﬂict situation and ﬁnd best practices
to identify the most import sectors to support, craft and inﬂuence private initiatives so as
to maximise the development impact of their interventions.
While DFIs have an important role to play in post-conﬂict and fragile situations, a last
hurdle is not speciﬁc to these difﬁcult situations. It relates to the ability of DFIs to close the
development ﬁnance gap. Many DFIs have institutional capacity shortcomings and
inadequate stafﬁng that could hamper their processing of applications for ﬁnance and
the identiﬁcation of priority investments and bankable projects (Banda, 2014). Insti-
tutional weaknesses and capacity constraints added to budgetary shortfalls result in a
failure of DFIs to respond to national or regional development needs. In some cases, pol-
itical agendas hold DFIs hostage as governments’ link project identiﬁcation and develop-
ment to their terms in power. Unless this last hurdle is overcome, the potential of DFIs in
closing the development ﬁnance gap will vanish.
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